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ACCOUNTABILITY IN RECONSTRUCTION: THE
NEED FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN POSTDISASTER RECONSTRUCTION TO PROTECT
HOUSING INTERESTS OF POOR AND MINORITY
RESIDENTS
Justine M. Cannon*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When a major disaster devastates a region, the cost of
both emergency assistance to residents and reconstruction of
damaged infrastructure can be exorbitant.' Congress has
maintained some form of federal disaster relief program for
nearly two centuries to assist states in these efforts.2 The
current program provides qualifying states no less than
seventy-five percent
of the funding necessary to recover from
3
a major disaster.

Congress provides grants to states during post-disaster
reconstruction to rebuild devastated regions.4
Such
reconstruction grants are awarded to states virtually
unconditionally, even though a mechanism exists to place

*Senior Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., Journalism, California Polytechnic
State University, San Luis Obispo. Special thanks to my family for their
unwavering support.
1. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT BOARD,
CHAPTER
6:
REIMBURSEMENT,
at
http'/www.ciwmb.ca.gov/disaster/disasterplan/PDF/Chapter6.pdf (last visited
Oct. 22, 2006).
2. Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried By Fire"'. DisasterRelief
and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
967, 1011 (1998).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(b) (2000). Funding is also provided to individuals
under the federal relief program, but this comment addresses only funding to
states.
4. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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additional conditions on fund grants.5 The issue is whether
the best interests of all state residents are represented under
the current federal disaster relief system, where state officials
rebuild a region without federal direction and subject to
political pressures existing in the state. Specifically, will the
housing needs of the poor and minority communities be
adequately considered under a reconstruction system driven
by local interests?
This comment highlights potential problems that could
arise when the federal government distances itself from state
reconstruction planning.
Part II sets out background
information necessary to formulate a proper analysis in this
area.' Pa4 II.A describes the disaster relief program in its
current form, including discussion of the governing statutethe Stafford Act'-and the administrative agency designated
to administer disaster relief-the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).8 Part II.B discusses the ability
to place conditions on federal grants to states.9 Included in
this section is a discussion of the available mechanism to
place such conditions and the constitutionality of placing
additional conditions on grants. °
The history of disaster relief is presented in Part II.C.1,
specifically highlighting the difficulty encountered by poor

5. The FEMA-State Agreement places certain binding conditions on a
State before federal funds are granted following a major disaster. See infra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The Agreement acts to: (1) prescribe the
manner in which federal aid under the Stafford Act is to be made available; (2)
list areas within the State that are eligible for assistance; (3) stipulate any
division of costs among federal, state and local governments; and (4) specify the
period recognized as the duration of the major disaster or emergency. See 44
C.F.R. § 206.44(b) (2005). Within a typical Agreement, specific requirements
regarding the method of rebuilding a region, or the proper planning of such an
effort, are not included. See, e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Sample:
FEMA-State
Agreement,
http'//www.training.fema.gov/EMIWEb/IS/islToolkit (follow "Unit 6: Recovery"
hyperlink; then follow "SAMPLE FEMA-State Agreement" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006).
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (originally enacted as Disaster Relief
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974)). See discussion infra Part
H.A.
8. See discussion infra Part HI.A.
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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and minority populations in obtaining relief.1 ' Part II.C.2
transitions into a contemporary disaster relief case studyNew Orleans following Hurricane Katrina-to illustrate the
circumstances in which the current relief program may be
inadequate to facilitate reconstruction efforts. 2 Part II.D
goes on to explore another federal relief program, urban
renewal, in order to make comparisons between it and the
Stafford Act program.3
The problem this comment identifies-namely, an
inadequate level of federal oversight in post-disaster
reconstruction by states-is addressed in Part III."4 Part IV
analyzes the disaster relief program under the Stafford Act.'"
The section identifies the implications of the Act's current
provisions for poor and minority communities, highlights the
portions of urban renewal that are somewhat beneficial to
these communities, and explains the need for more sociallyconscious disaster relief legislation to ensure proper
16
reconstruction of New Orleans and other devastated areas.
This leads finally to the proposal of this comment in Part Vthat Congress and FEMA should make reconstruction grants
to states conditional on the creation of a comprehensive
reconstruction plan that sufficiently addresses the housing
needs of poor and minority communities. v

II. BACKGROUND
A. Fundingin the Wake of Disaster-TheStafford Act
Federal disaster relief funding to the states is governed
by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act).' 8
The Act governs major
disasters 9 and emergencies2 ° declared by the President 2 ' on
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
12. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
13. See discussion infra Part II.D.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part V.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2003).
19. A "major disaster" is:
[Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm,
high water

.

.

.

tsunami, earthquake . ..

. . . which in the

determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and

96
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or after November 23, 1988, providing specific provisions for
22
emergency relief and hazard mitigation.
The express purpose of the Act is "to provide an orderly
and continuing means of assistance by the Federal
Government to State and local governments in carrying out
their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage
caused by disasters."23 Through enactment of the Stafford
Act, Congress recognized the necessity for special postdisaster measures to assist affected states in "expediting the
rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and [in]
the reconstruction and rehabilitationof devastated areas."24
Among other things, Congress intended to provide federal
assistance programs for both public and private losses
sustained in disasters. 5 To this end, the President is given
power under the Act to prescribe rules and regulations as
necessary and proper to carry out the Act's provisions.2 6
The Stafford Act further allows the President to exercise
the authority given to him by the Act through a federal

magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to
supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local
governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
Id. § 5122(2).
20. An "emergency" is:
[Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public
health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in
any part of the United States.
Id. § 5122(1).
21. The governor of a state must make a request to the President in order
for a major disaster to be declared. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.35 (2005) (enumerating
the factors upon which the governor should base his/her request for
declaration); id. § 206.36 (outlining the procedures for requesting an emergency
declaration).
22. Specific provisions include encouragement of loss reduction in future
disasters, such as obtaining insurance, and establishing a cost-sharing provision
between States and the federal government, where the minimum federal share
is seventy-five percent of necessary funding. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(b) (establishing
cost-sharing provision); Disaster Relief; Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act; Implementation, Etc., 54 Fed. Reg. 22,162, 22,164
(May 22, 1989) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. pt. 206) (discussing loss reduction
measures).
23. H.R. REP. No. 100-517, at 1 (1988).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (emphasis added).
25. Id. § 5121(b)(6).
26. Id. § 5201(a)(1).
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agency as he may designate.2 7 FEMA is the federal agency
28
chosen to administer disaster relief.
FEMA responded to the Stafford Act by publishing Code
of Federal Regulations sections to facilitate the Act's
execution.2 9
Incorporating the Stafford Act's purpose of
providing federal assistance for both public and private losses
and needs sustained in disasters, 0 the FEMA regulations
provide assistance to both affected states and their
residents. 3' Grant assistance to the states funds small and
large projects to restore a facility to its prior use,32 as well as
alternate projects when the public welfare would not best be
served by restoring a damaged facility or a function of that
facility.3 Alternate projects can be used to repair or expand
public facilities, construct new facilities, or fund hazard
mitigation measures.34
B. Placing Conditionson State DisasterFundingand the
Feasibilityof IncludingAdditional Conditions
FEMA regulations provide a mechanism for the federal
government to place conditions on federal disaster relief to
the states-the "FEMA-State Agreement."3 The Agreement
must be executed between the governor, acting for the state,
and the FEMA Regional Director, acting for the federal
government, before emergency or disaster funding is
extended to a qualifying state. 6 The Agreement includes the
understandings, commitments, and conditions 37 for assistance
27. Id.; see also id. § 5164.
28. The President, by Executive Order, delegated his powers under the
Stafford Act to the Director of FEMA. Delegation of Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Functions, Exec. Order No. 12,673, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,571
(Mar. 28, 1989).
29. 44 C.F.R. §§ 206 (2005).
30. Id. § 206.3.
31. Regarding housing matters specifically, FEMA provides affected
individuals with: (1) temporary housing assistance; and (2) funding for repairs
to uninsured owner-occupied residences and other residential structures. Id. §
206.117.
32. Id. § 206.203(d)(1). A "small project" has a total cost up to $35,000; a
"large project" has a total cost of more than $35,000. Id. § 206.203(c).
33. Id. § 206.203(d)(2).
34. Id. § 206.203(d)(2)(iv).
35. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.44.
36. Id. § 206.44(a).
37. A typical FEMA-State Agreement includes a number of conditions,
including, but not limited to, requiring a requesting state to: (1) cooperate with
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under which FEMA shall provide disaster funds. 8 It imposes
binding obligations on FEMA, the state, and local
governments in the form of legally enforceable conditions for
assistance.3 9
The terms and conditions of the Agreement must comply
with the provisions of all applicable laws, executive orders,
and regulations.4 0 For example, Executive Order 12,612, 4'
adopted by FEMA, is applicable to federal disaster relief.42
This executive order mandates that, where feasible, federal
agencies consult with state and local officials before
implementing an action that would limit the policymaking
discretion of a state.4 3
Conditions included in the FEMA-State Agreement must
also be drafted to survive constitutional scrutiny. Although
conditional funding provisions' are often necessary to ensure

the federal government; (2) create
assistance; (3) follow up with
mitigation actions are taken; and
plan. WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION

a program of non-discrimination in disaster
applicants to ensure appropriate hazard
(4) prepare and submit a hazard mitigation
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT, ANNEX GG: FEMA-STATE AGREEMENT 2-3 (2002), available at

http://www.wvdhsem.gov/EOP/preparedness/WV%20Plan-ANNEX%20GG.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
38. Id. The FEMA-State Agreement: (1) identifies the incident type and
period; (2) specifies types of assistance; (3) identifies key personnel; (4) lists
eligible areas; (5) outlines cost sharing provisions; and (6) includes special terms
and conditions. See NETWORK OF STATE HAZARD MITIGATION OFFICERS, THE
DISASTER DECLARATION PROCESS 10-9 (2d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.nemaweb.org/?472; see also supra note 5.
39. 44 C.F.R.

§

206.44(a).

40. Id. § 206.44(b); Disaster Relief; Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act; Implementation, Etc., 54 Fed. Reg. 22,162 (May 22,
1989).

41. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 30, 1987).
42. See 44 C.F.R. § 13.
43. See 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685; see also Disaster Assistance; Federal Assistance
to Individuals and Households, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,446, 61,451 (Sept. 30, 2002).
Under the executive order, agency rules must comply with the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) "common rule," requiring the appropriate
division of governmental responsibilities between the federal government and
the states. See 54 Fed. Reg. 22,162. FEMA satisfied the requirements of the
executive order in formulating the proposed rule that was to become 44 C.F.R.
§§ 206, implementing the Stafford Act for federal disaster relief. FEMA met
with a number of state representatives, and continued to consult with those
representatives in the course of the development of the final rule. See 67 Fed.
Reg. at 61,451.
44. Incident to the spending power, "Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
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that grants provided under Congress' spending power 45 are
properly used, 46 the ability to place such conditions is not
unlimited. 47 Generally speaking, conditions may be placed on
congressional grants of federal monies if those conditions: (1)
promote the general welfare; (2) are expressly stated so states
unambiguously know the consequences of accepting federal
funds; and (3) have some relationship to the purpose of the
spending program at issue.48
Further, in order to preserve state and local autonomy
from federal encroachment,49 conditional spending provisions
cannot be overly coercive on the states. 50 Congress has the
power, however, to encourage states to act in a particular way
or to influence a state's policy decisions through incentivesfor example, through conditional federal grants.5
The
residents of the state retain the definitive choice about
whether to comply because they can ultimately choose to
decline a federal grant based on undesirable conditions.5 2
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (internal citations
omitted).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("Congress shall have the Power To . . .
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ...
46. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 85 (1936). "It is a contradiction
in terms to say that there is power to spend for the national welfare, while
rejecting any power to impose conditions reasonably adapted to the attainment
of the end which alone would justify the expenditure." Id.
47. "If the power to tie conditions to federal funds were really unlimited,
Congress could use the spending power to destroy balances achieved at the
Constitutional Convention and in almost two centuries of Supreme Court
decisions-balances between congressional power on the one hand and civil
liberties and federalism on the other." Albert J. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederal
Spending and the Constitution,39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (1987).
48. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 273 (2d ed. 2002).
49. See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1133. The concept of state sovereignty
was established in the Tenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
50. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
51. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
52. Id. at 168; see also Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1140 n.165 (citing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (Supp. 1979)) (taking
the view that governments cannot generally complain about restrictions tied to
money they accept from the federal government, which the author believes
reflects the approach of the Court in analyzing conditional spending provisions).
On the other hand, critics of conditional federal funding believe it places some
states, without equivalent, alternative sources of revenue, in a position where
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court has never invalidated
conditional federal spending as impermissibly impeding state
autonomy.5 3
In fact, in the course of invalidating
congressional efforts to directly compel states to take certain
action, suggesting that such efforts are an impermissible
intrusion on state autonomy, courts indicate that similar
goals can be achieved constitutionally through employment of
conditional spending.5 4
Modern analysis suggests that
conditions need only be within the purview of congressional
power, which is itself satisfied by preventing negative side
effects of a proposed program.55
Despite differing opinions about the necessity and utility
of conditional spending, 56 the governing rule remains that
Congress has the ability to provide conditional funding to the
states for, among other things, disaster relief. Additional
conditions can feasibly be placed in the FEMA-State
Agreement if the conditions, at minimum, follow the
mandates of applicable law, like Executive Order 12,612, 27
and the three-part constitutional test."
If conditions on
they must comply with unattractive funding conditions in order to receive
requisite funds. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States'
Rights, 574 ANNALS 104, 106-7 (2001).
53. Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1133.
54. See id.; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67.
55. See Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 1133.
56. Some critics believe Congress should be confined to placing restrictions
on states that it could directly mandate the states to adopt. Baker, supra note
52, at 109-10. Otherwise, some say Congress would be tempted to attach
strings to its expenditures to coerce recipients into conduct Congress could not
constitutionally compel through direct regulation. Rosenthal, supra note 47, at
1104.
Conversely, proponents of conditional federal spending believe a total
reliance on congressional intervention would be beneficial, relieving officials at
the local level of decision-making responsibilities. Peter W. Salsich, Jr.,
Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN.
L. REV. 333, 361 (1984). As one commentator suggests, "[N]o one is more
qualified structurally and statutorily to help our nation respond to and recover
from disasters [than FEMAI. FEMA has the direct line relationships with state
and local governments because of grant programs and the disaster relief
programs operated through the Stafford Act." Recovering After Katrina:
Ensuring That FEMA is up to the Task, Testimony Before the House Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management (2005) (statement of Albert
Ashwood, Vice President, National Emergency Management Association),
available at http://www.nemaweb.org/?1495.
57. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
58. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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disaster relief funding met those base requirements, while
avoiding the coerciveness proscribed by the Tenth
Amendment, 9 they could be supported.
C. Implications of Historicaland Modern-Day Federal
DisasterRelief Programson Minorities and Poor Populations
1.

DisasterRelief of the Past-An Entitlement Program

Congressional funding of disaster relief began in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. ° Concern that all
persons receive equal treatment from Congress pervaded
virtually every discussion of relief during that time. 61 There
was fear, however, of setting precedent that would drain the
nation's resources, a fear that resulted in6 2the denial of many
claims in the early years of disaster relief.
Concerns about precedent and equitable treatment
contributed to the construction of narratives utilized in the
nineteenth century,6 3 in which certain events were
compensated and others were ignored.6 4 Successful appeals
for relief involved sudden, unforeseeable events, a blameless
petitioner, and losses implicating the federal government.6 5
The "moral innocence" of the claimant was the most frequent
justification for awarding relief between 1789 and 1870.66
Under this framework, poor populations affected by
disaster were routinely denied relief in the formative years of
the federal disaster program.
"Exceptional poverty," in
which a person lost class status as a result of a disaster and
was "suddenly made poor by an act of Providence,"68 was
distinguished from "ordinary poverty."69
Victims of the
former were deemed blameless victims of an unfair fate who
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
60. Landis, supra note 2, at 1011.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For a description of what "narrative" means in this context, see id. at
1017 ("[Sludden, unforeseeable events for which the petitioner was blameless
and that caused losses implicating the federal government. . . . It was . . .
required that they claim to have suffered losses through no fault of their own.").
64. Landis, supra note 2, at 1017.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1018.
67. See id. at 1020-21.
68. Id. (citing 3 CONG. DEB. 766 (1827) (statement of Rep. Campbell)).
69. Id. at 1020-21.
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should "not be held responsible for their own misfortune." 70
The latter individuals, on the other hand, were considered
relatively indolent, with an inability to contribute to the
wealth and defense of the nation through their labor.7 1
The "blameless victim" narrative affected the ability of
racial minorities to obtain disaster relief.7 2 Race historically
shaped a disaster relief claimant's ability to cross the
threshold of virtuous need; African-Americans and other
racial minorities have frequently been denied the role of the
moral innocent-historically a requirement for disaster relief
claimants. 3
2.

Operationof DisasterRelief Under the Stafford Act

Within the past two decades, a large amount of federal
relief monies have been distributed by FEMA under the
Stafford Act.
Qualifying disasters7 4 have included
California's Northridge Earthquake in 1994, the attack on the
World Trade Center in 2001, and the hurricanes experienced
in the Gulf Coast region of the United States in 2005."5
a.

ReconstructingNew OrleansAfter Hurricane
Katrina:A Case Study in Contemporary
FederalDisasterRelief

Disaster relief rose to the forefront of our collective
consciousness following a devastating natural disaster in the
southern region of the United States-Hurricane Katrina.
This disaster gives occasion to evaluate the effectiveness of
the current federal disaster relief program.
i.

Disaster Hits a Divided City

On August 29, 2005, Tropical Storm Katrina,7 6 a
Category Four hurricane with winds up to 145 miles per
hour, reached the central Gulf Coast of the United States.77
70. Id. at 1021.
71. See id.
72. Landis, supra note 2, at 1023.
73. Id. at 1023-24.
74. See supra note 19 (defining "major disaster" under the Stafford Act).
75. See FEMA, Most Expensive
Presidentially-Declared
Disasters,
http://www.fema.gov/media/top-disasters.shtm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
76. Hereinafter referred to as "Hurricane Katrina" or simply "Katrina."
77. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM, NEW
ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST. A PLAN FOR THE
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When the storm reached New Orleans, floodwalls protecting
the city's low-lying neighborhoods broke, flooding large areas
of the city.78 Approximately 90,000 square miles of the Gulf
Coast region-an area roughly the size of the United
Kingdom-was
affected
by
Hurricane
Katrina.7 9
Metropolitan New Orleans bore the brunt of the storm."
Residing in the area's flood zone were some 583,000 people.8 '
Eighty-six percent of the city's metropolitan population lived
in areas that were in some way affected by the storm, and
forty-five percent of the housing units in the metropolitan
area were actually flooded.8 2
Immediately following the hurricane, living rooms
nationwide were barraged with television images of New
Orleans residents climbing to their rooftops or being held in
grim conditions in the New Orleans Superdome. 3 Fifty
percent of New Orleans' population lived in houses with over
four feet of flood water.8 4 Thousands of modest homes in
urban areas and low-lying suburbs were inundated with
water, while higher-value neighborhoods, such as the French
Quarter and downtown, remained relatively dry. 5
Given New Orleans' sharp geographic division along
racial and economic lines, flooding of the city's metropolitan
region disproportionately affected poor, minority renters.8 6

FUTURE
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf
[hereinafter
BROOKINGS REPORT].
78. Id.
79. Id at 13.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 13-14.
83. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 1.
84. BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK COMM'N, URBAN PLANNING COMM., ACTION
PLAN FOR NEW ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY, fig. 5 (2006), available at
http://bringneworleansback.org/Portals/BringNewOrleansBack/Resources/Urba
n%20Planning%2OAction%20Plan%2OFinal%20Report.pdf.
85. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 1.
86. Id. at 16-17.
New Orleans had developed areas with high
concentrations of poverty. Id. at 6-7. Fewer whites lived in such areas; fortythree percent of poor blacks lived in areas of concentrated poverty, while only
eleven percent of poor whites did. Gwen Filosa, Report Blames Racial, Class
Divisions; New Orleans Left its Black People, Poor at Risk, TIMES PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Oct. 13, 2005, at N2. The majority of New Orleans' poor
population at the time of the hurricane was composed of racial minorities. The
African-American poverty rate in New Orleans was three times higher than the
white poverty rate-thirty-five percent compared with eleven percent.
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According to one source: "People in New Orleans know that
the class and race distinctions in the city correspond to the
sea levels of the residents. The poorest are forced to endure
the risks of life below sea level because that is where the most
"87
'affordable' housing is.
Citywide, minority populations
constituted seventy-four percent of the flood zone
Minorities, especially African-Americans,
population. 88
realized the greatest devastation because they lived in the
lowest-lying, more flood-prone sections of the city. 9 With
greater means and power, the white population generally
occupied the well-drained, elevated areas of New Orleans. 90
ii. Picking Up the Pieces: Rebuilding a Broken City
Rebuilding New Orleans is "a task of epic proportions,"9
but New Orleans is slowly reviving as reconstruction efforts
Planning started shortly after Hurricane
are underway.
Katrina hit. For example, the Bring New Orleans Back
Commission (Commission) was formed within approximately
in October 2005, to make recovery
one month,
recommendations to the city.92 The Commission's Urban
Planning Committee presented an action plan in January
2006, which addressed the physical aspects of recovery and
rebuilding.9 3
Certain neighborhoods, on higher ground, have reopened
BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 7. By 2000, no less than eighty-four
percent of the city's poor population was African-American. Id. at 6.
87. Eric Mann, Race and the High Ground in New Orleans: African
American Statistics, 19 WORLD WATCH 40 (2006).
88. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 15. The neighborhoods below sea
level, all with high percentages of African-American residents, include the
Lower Ninth Ward (ninety-eight percent black), Eastern Orleans (over eighty
percent black), Audubon (eighty-six percent black), Touro (seventy-four percent
black), and the French Quarter (ninety percent black). Mann, supra note 87, at
40.
89. Filosa, supra note 86.
90. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 13.

91. Joe Gyan Jr., N.O. Officials: Money Vital: Nagin, Others Claim 100-Day
Progress, but Cite Funding Drag, THE ADVOCATE,

Sept. 13, 2006, at 03B

(quoting New Orleans' mayor, C. Ray Nagin). Some believe the devastation
caused by Hurricane Katrina will require the largest disaster relief and
reconstruction effort in the nation's history. Editorial, What the Gulf Needs,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2005, at B10. As to overall economic costs, estimates have
ranged from $100 billion to $200 billion, with several well-respected estimates
in the range of $120 billion. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 13.
92. BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note 84, at foreword.

93. Id.
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permanently. 94
For example, the predominantly-white
Lakeview district is "roaring back to middle-class life," and
most Lakeview homeowners have committed to returning
home.9 5 Conversely, in much of the Lower Ninth Ward
district, 96 where residents are ninety-eight percent AfricanAmerican and mostly working-class, the streets remain
predominantly empty.97 In May 2006, there was still no
electricity, drinkable water, gas, or signs of rebuilding. 9
Many residents of this district have no firm plans to return
home. 99

A little more than one year after the storm, New Orleans'
population was only about half of pre-Katrina figures. 100
Thousands of evacuees scattered around the country are
starting new lives where they are.'0 ' This is particularly true
of former residents of the neighborhoods that realized the
greatest flooding, like the Lower Ninth Ward.' 012 These
neighborhoods remain uninhabitable, debris-filled ghost
towns.0 3
The Commission calls these heavily damaged

94. See Julia Silverman, Associated Press, Merchants, Residents Return to
New
Orleans,
USA
TODAY,
Sept.
29,
2005,
available at
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/news/2005-09-29-NewOrleansreopens.x.htm.
95. Blaine Harden, A City's ChangingFace, WASH. POST, May 17, 2006, at
A01. East New Orleans is also cited as witnessing a number of stores opening
and residents returning. Karen Sloan, Evacuees in Omaha Still Yearn for
Home, New Orleans Calls Some to Return, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 10,

2006, at Bi.
96. This comment will refer to this New Orleans district interchangeably as
"the Lower Ninth Ward," "the Ninth Ward," and "the Lower Nine."
97. Harden, supra note 95, at A01.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Sloan, supra note 95, at B 1.
100. Gyan, supra note 91, at 03B. Mayor C. Ray Nagin predicts, some say
mistakenly, that about 300,000 people will be living in the city by the end of
2006, and that the city will realize an economic boom that will make New
Orleans a "vibrant city" within three years. See id.; Ann M. Simmons, In New
Orleans, "Opportunity," L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A4. The Bring New
Orleans Back Commission estimates a New Orleans population of 247,000 by
September 2008. BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note 84, at fig. 11.

101. Robert Tanner, Associated Press, Will New Orleans Abandon Its Poor?,
SAN

DIEGO

UNION-TRIB.,

Oct.

13,

2005,

available

at

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20051013/newslnl3poor.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
102. See id.
103. Michelle Roberts, Nagin will focus on rebuilding city; Debris removal,
new housing top priorities for his next 4-year term as New Orleans mayor,
DETROIT NEWS, May 22, 2006, at 8A.
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It
neighborhoods "Neighborhood Planning Areas." °4
recommends that a planning process be implemented to
determine the future of these105areas, but that building permits
for these areas not be issued.
The Lower Nine was reopened on December 1, 2005, but
only for a "look and leave" opportunity, allowing residents to
salvage what they could from their damaged homes.' 6 While
elevated neighborhoods permanently reopened and began
rebuilding as early as September 2005,107 the "look and leave"
status of neighborhoods like the Ninth Ward will continue
indefinitely.1 0 8 New Orleans' mayor, C. Ray Nagin, pledges
that the Lower Ninth Ward will be rebuilt.109 Nevertheless,
tens of thousands of flooded-out homes are slated for
demolition, many of them in the hard-hit Ninth Ward. 110
Additionally, the levee system has not been fortified to
the
withstand a Category Five storm."' Many areas like
112
fortification.
such
without
rebuilt
be
cannot
Ninth Ward
Many worry that poor, African-American residents
simply will not return to New Orleans. 113 Studies show that
lower-income
especially
residents,
African-American
residents from the Lower Ninth Ward and the city's public
housing projects, are much more likely to take up permanent

104. BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note 84, at fig. 41.
105. Id. at figs. 53, 61.
Orleans Opens Final Devastated
106. Agence France-Presse, New
at
3,
2005,
Dec.
Residents,
to
Neighborhood
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/NewOrleans-OpensFinal_
DevastatedNeighborhoodToResidents.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
107. Silverman, supra note 94 (stating that the following districts were
opened to business owners in September 2005: Garden District, French Quarter,
Central Business, and Uptown; also stating that the Algiers neighborhood was
formally opened).
108. See Agence France-Presse, supra note 106.
109. Deborah Sontag, Longing for a Home in a Sealed New Orleans Ward,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at Al.
110. Tanner, supra note 101; see also BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note
84, at 15 (reporting that "ultimately it may be necessary to demolish a large
number of buildings to protect the public health and safety" in the Lower Ninth
Ward).
111. Editorial, Ray Nagin's Challenge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 23, 2006,
at 10A [hereinafter Ray Nagin's Challenge]. Hurricane Katrina was a Category
Four storm. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 13.
112. Some suggest it is too risky to reconstruct these areas even after the
levees have been fortified. Id.
113. Tanner, supra note 101.
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residence outside of New Orleans." 4
For these AfricanAmericans, "generations-old networks of kinfolk, church folk
and friends have been obliterated or transplanted to another
state where distance and the cost of travel undermine their
ability to come home, even for short visits."1 15 Aside from
travel costs, the dearth of affordable housing is also a large
impediment for many evacuees wanting to return to New
Orleans.

116

Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)," 7 said, "New
114. Harden, supra note 95, at A01. Many moved to the Houston and
Atlanta areas. Id. More than two-thirds of the poorest New Orleans residents
who fled to Houston after the hurricane plan to stay there. Allan Turner, Of
Poorest Evacuees, 69% Plan to Stay, HOuS. CHRON., Sept. 8, 2006, at Al. There
are two main reasons cited for this: (1) many were renters, and the current
rental situation in New Orleans is bleak; and (2) many worked in the service
industry, which is still rocky in New Orleans. Id.
For a visual depiction of the diaspora of displaced New Orleans
residents as of October 2005, see BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note 84, at
fig. 10.
115. Harden, supra note 95, at A01. Many middle-class whites, on the other
hand, fled in their own cars and tended not to go far. Id.
116. Editorial, Home Sweet Home, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 20,
2006.
Ginny Goldman, spokesperson for the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now, said, "Based on an extremely slow rebuilding
process in New Orleans and the shortage of affordable housing, it's clear that
people don't have the alternative to return. People do want to go home. . . but
they're starting to lose hope." Turner, supra note 114, at A6.
117. HUD was created as a Cabinet department of the United States
government in 1965, under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD's History,
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/ hudhistory.cfm (last visited Oct. 22,
2006). HUD's mission is to "increase homeownership, support community
development and increase access to affordable housing free from
discrimination." U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD's
Mission, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf12/hudmission.cfm
(last visited
Oct. 22, 2006).
Among other grant programs, HUD administers the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program. U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Community Development Block Grant Program-CDBG,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
communitydevelopmentfprograms/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). The CDBG
Program administers annual grants "to develop viable communities by
providing decent housing, a suitable living environment, and opportunities to
expand economic opportunities, principally for low- and moderate-income
persons. Id.
As of September 2006, $869 million of CDBG grants were
allocated to repair units owned by small landlords in New Orleans, and $594
million of block grants were designated to create or rebuild larger rental
developments in the city. Laura Maggi, LRA's Rental Program Criticized: It's
Too Focused on Low Incomes, Bureau Says, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
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Orleans is not going to be as black as it was for a long time, if
ever again."11 8 In fact, the projections indicate that the black
demographic in New Orleans will decrease from two-thirds of
the overall population before Hurricane Katrina, to only
thirty-five to forty percent of the population following
reconstruction." 9 "As a practical matter, these poor folks
don't have the resources to go back to our city just like they
didn't have the resources to get out of our city," said Joseph
Canizaro, once one of New Orleans' biggest developers and a
member of the city's rebuilding commission. 2 0 "So we won't
get all those black folks2back. That's just a fact. It's not what
I want, it's just a fact."' '
To exacerbate this problem, some are concerned that
politicians, urban planners, and developers responsible for
rebuilding the city will not leave room for the poor
communities in their master plan. 1 22 Some even suggest that
the disaster will be used as a glorious opportunity to engineer
poverty out of New Orleans altogether. 23 Some business
owners and local officials, for example, were eager to replace
the Ninth Ward, and other low-lying neighborhoods, with
parks. 24 This leads some to project that the reconstruction of
Sept. 9, 2006.
118. Tanner, supra note 101. Despite this comment, Jackson says that black
leaders are stirring up unnecessary racial animosity by commenting on the
situation after Katrina. Lori Rodriguez & Zeke Minaya, New Orleans' Racial
Makeup Up in the Air, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 29, 2005, at B1, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/3374480.html.
Jackson says, "I
wish that the so-called black leadership would stop running around this country
...making this a racial issue." Id.
119. See id. (statement by A. Jackson).
120. Tanner, supra note 101. Canizaro has emerged as perhaps the single
most influential business executive from New Orleans. Gary Rivlin, A Mogul
Who Would Rebuild New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at C1. He has
close ties to Mayor Nagin and President George W. Bush. Id. Canizaro is also a
member of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission. Bring New Orleans Back,
httpJ/bringneworleansback.org/ (follow "Commission Members" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
121. Tanner, supra note 101.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ray Nagin's Challenge, supra note 111. This plan has since been
abandoned.
Mayor Nagin has expressed a lack of goodwill toward these
businesspeople, saying, "Businesspeople are predators, and if the economic
opportunities are here, they're going to stay. If they don't, I'll send them a
postcard." Simmons, supra note 100, at A4. Nagin says he is not automatically
going to turn neighborhoods heavily flooded by Katrina into "green space."
Gyan, supra note 91, at 03B.
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New Orleans will become "the biggest, most brutal urban
renewal project black America has ever seen."12

For some,

to
the disaster could be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
26
remake New Orleans into a "whiter and richer" city.1

D. Urban Renewal-A FederalRelief Program with a
Different Approach
The issue of adequately providing for displaced persons
When
arises in contexts other than disaster relief.
of
a
result
individuals in urban communities are displaced as
governmental activity to promote redevelopment, it is also an
extremely complex situation.'27 One such governmental
activity is the urban renewal project-the acquisition by
public authorities of abandoned or substandard, but occupied,
buildings. 128 This comment presents an overview of urban
renewal, and the provisions of its corresponding federal relief
program, in order to make comparisons to the provisions of
the federal disaster relief program under the Stafford Act.
1. A Socially-ConsciousRelief Program
1 29
Displacement, especially during the early years of slum

clearance, was a central purpose of the urban renewal
Within approximately ten years of urban
program. 130
renewal's inception in 1949, an estimated 177,000 families
and over131 39,000 businesses were displaced under the
program.
Despite the levels of displacement inherent in the urban
renewal program, however, the program is characterized by
resourceful efforts to ease the displacement hardships it
125. Tanner, supra note 101; see also infra Part II.D for a discussion of urban
renewal projects.
126. See Charles Gibson, ABC World News: A Closer Look: Race and
HurricaneKatrina (ABC television broadcast Aug. 29, 2006) (transcript on file
with Santa Clara University Law Review).
127. Salsich, supra note 56, at 339.
128. Id. at 340.
129. "Slum" generally refers to an urban area with buildings declared unfit
for human habitation. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "PublicMenace" of Blight:
Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 7-8 (2003).
RELATIONS,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMM'N ON
ADVISORY
130. See
RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED BY
GOVERNMENTS 15 (1965) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM'N].
131. Id.
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causes.'32 It is the first major program in urban areas in
which the government publicly accepted responsibility for
ensuring adequate available housing for those displaced by
133
government property takings.
Urban renewal has a corresponding relief program to
assist persons who own or live in buildings that the
government seeks to restructure. Those displaced by urban
renewal and similar public reinvestment activities are
provided relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policy Act
(URA).13
The URA provides assistance to qualifying
displacees 135 in the following forms: relocation expenses;' 3 6
advisory services for displaced renters; 37 payments for
affected owner-occupied dwellings; 138 mortgage insurance for
homeowners; 39 additional monies for qualifying renters that
could be used as a down payment for home purchase; 140 and
creation of replacement dwellings where none are available
4
and none can be procured by the federal government.1 '
2. Elements of Federal-StateCoordination
The statutes governing urban renewal relief facilitate
coordination between federal and local governments. The
URA program is largely financed by federal funds14 ' and
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2003). The full purpose of the URA is:
[Flor the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a direct
result of programs or projects undertaken by a Federal agency or with
Federal financial assistance. The primary purpose... is to ensure that
such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of
programs and projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole
and to minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons.
Id. § 4621(b).
135. Note that aliens not legally present in the United States are not eligible

for relief under URA. Id. § 4605(a).
136. Id. § 4622(a).
137. Id. § 4625(f).

138. The amount may not exceed $22,500, and is awarded for three
enumerated purposes. Id. § 4623(a).
139. Id. § 4623(b).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4624.
141. Id. § 4626.
142. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Overview of
the

Uniform

Act

(URA),

httpJ/www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/
relocation/overview.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). Other funds are provided by
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shaped by federal laws and regulations, but conducted with
considerable policy discretion by local agencies.143
This
federal-local program places "strong emphasis on local
responsibility for conceiving, planning, and carrying out
renewal projects" with the federal government primarily
providing 4 financial
assistance and general program
14
direction.
3.

Criticisms of the UrbanRenewal Program

The urban renewal program is not without its problems.
Critics of redevelopment projects voice concern that such
projects are not only used to make a community more
productive, but also to eliminate "undesirables"--namely
poor, minority residents-from certain communities. 4 5
Frequently, housing built in renewed areas is geared
toward middle- and upper-income families, beyond the
financial means of the displaced residents. 46 While the goal
of the urban renewal program is to provide a decent home for
every American, urban renewal is often blamed for reducing
the amount of low-rent housing available to city dwellers. 4
Regardless of the ultimate success of the urban renewal
program, however, the provisions of the program provide a
framework for federal-state cooperation that can be applied to
federal disaster relief.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

The federal disaster relief program, as it currently exists,
places conditions on the attainment of federal funds through
the FEMA-State Agreement, but these conditions do not
Federal funding for
relate to reconstruction efforts."*

the agencies conducting projects under the URA. Id. These agencies are
required to pay for a number of things under the URA, including, for example:
providing relocation advisory services to displaced tenants and owner
occupants, reimbursing tenants for moving expenses, and providing payments
for the added cost of renting or purchasing comparable rental housing. Id.
143. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 130, at 15.

144. Id. at 16.
145. See Salsich, supra note 56, at 373. Others have criticized urban renewal
as a program of "Negro removal." RICHARD A. BINGHAM, PUBLIC HOUSING AND
URBAN RENEWAL: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 204 (1975).
146. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 130, at 30.
147. BINGHAM, supra note 145, at 57.

148. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also supra note 5.
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reconstruction is provided to qualifying states under the
current federal disaster relief program with little federal
accountability regarding reconstruction planning. 149
The
current procedure to qualify for a federal grant involves three
steps: (1) the state submits an application for a grant with the
federal government; (2) FEMA awards money in qualifying
amounts; and (3) the state is subsequently left to
plan. 150
reconstruction
a
formulate
independently
Essentially, there is a palpable lack of federal direction in
rebuilding devastated regions.
There are certainly some common sense advantages to
this approach. For example, state officials are presumably
best equipped to estimate the infrastructural needs of their
cities and the housing requirements of their constituents.
Unfortunately, poor and minority populations are often not
intimately involved in local politics,' 5 ' so their interests can
easily be ignored during reconstruction planning at the local
level.
This concern is particularly poignant when an area, like
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, is so devastated
by disaster that reconstruction becomes a job of essentially
reshaping an entire region. In such a situation, city planners
and officials should consider the needs of every displaced
resident. To ensure that a representative cross-section of the
city's pre-disaster demographic returns to the area, affordable
housing is required to accommodate displaced citizens in need
of such housing.', 2 The current federal relief program leaves
too much discretion to local officials in utilizing federal
reconstruction grants. As a result, the current program
provides no guarantee that poor and minority housing
149. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2003) (containing no provisions
placing reconstruction requirements on qualifying states or mandating federal

review of state reconstruction plans).
150. See id.
151. "The dominant paradigm in the study of political participation over the
past thirty years has emphasized socioeconomic status as the primary

determinant of individuals' engagement in politics and repeatedly demonstrated
that those with greater status are more likely to participate than those with
lesser status." JAN E. LEIGHLEY, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS?: THE POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 5 (2001). The key to racial

and ethnic participation is political mobilization of organized groups, which may
or may not exist. See id.
152. See generally BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 77, at 21-23 (describing
the locations of, and levels of poverty in, the city's public housing projects).
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interests will be integrated into the chosen reconstruction
plan.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. History Repeating-FederalRelief Programs That Fail to
Affirmatively ProtectPoor and Minority Interests
Disaster relief programs implemented centuries ago
underrepresented poor and minority interests. 153 In the
nineteenth century, individuals deemed insufficiently
"blameless"-often poor people of color-were systematically
denied disaster relief.1 4
Some suggest that success in
obtaining disaster relief is connected to one's societal statusa status that is rooted in ever-changing circumstances of race
and politics. 155 Consequently, the ability of disfavored racial
groups to lay claim to resources also varies over time.' 56 The
current disaster relief program is certainly much improved
compared to the disaster relief approach from centuries ago
because it does not systematically place any group in
disfavor.'5 7 Despite this seeming progress, however, some
suggest that racial minorities in the United States continue
to have a less certain possibility of successfully obtaining
relief than do white citizens. 5
The current federal disaster relief program lends to the
perpetuation of this disparity. The Stafford Act is less
pointed in its dismissal of poor and minority interests, but the
provisions of the Act-and the accompanying FEMA
regulations-as currently drafted could result in the
discounting of certain interests. The Stafford Act leaves
decisions concerning rebuilding a devastated region almost
entirely to the state.' 59 As minority and impoverished
populations generally lack the political clout necessary to
contribute meaningfully to a reconstruction plan formulated

153. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
154. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
155. Landis, supra note 2, at 1023.
156. Id.
157. In fact, there is a section of the Stafford Act that expressly prohibits
discrimination in the administration of the disaster relief program. See 42
U.S.C. § 5151 (2003).

158. Landis, supra note 2, at 1023.
159. See supra notes 5, 149-150 and accompanying text.
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tragically

B. Post-DisasterReconstruction of New Orleans Highlights
PotentialProblems with the CurrentDisasterRelief Program
The situation in New Orleans following Hurricane
Katrina effectively demonstrates the implications of
contemporary federal relief efforts. Minorities are no longer
being systematically denied disaster relief-many such
individuals received assistance in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.16 1 Seemingly equal distribution of benefits to
qualified individuals, however, does not assure that the
interests of each individual will be adequately represented
during reconstruction efforts. There is no guarantee that
state officials will consider minority interests
to any notable
162
degree when drafting a reconstruction plan.
The success of the reconstruction efforts in New Orleans
will depend in large measure on the blueprints ultimately
created by local and state officials. 163 Efforts to form a
reconstruction plan for the devastated city have seemingly
been misguided. Many competing ideas about how the city
should be rebuilt have surfaced.''
Some suggest rebuilding New Orleans in a manner that
avoids the extreme racial and economic divisions 165 that
existed in the city before the hurricane. 166 Taking a sociallyconscious approach, these commentators hope to see New
Orleans rebuilt in a way that would narrow the gap between
the "haves and have-nots." 16 ' The way to accomplish this is to
racially and socio-economically integrate the city, embracing
the African-American residents who gave the city much of its
identity, including its food, its music, and its celebrated street
life. 168 Developer Joseph Canizaro1 69 and others envision
160. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
161. FEMA provided rent expenses for relocation and temporary housing
units. See Josh P. Hamilton, New Orleans' Chaotic Post-Storm Market Has
Pushed Many Residents Out, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2005, at Bus. 3.
162. See supra notes 5, 151 and accompanying text.
163. Editorial, supra note 91.
164. See Filosa, supra note 86.
165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
166. Filosa, supra note 86.
167. Tanner, supra note 101.
168. Id.
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mixed-income housing, where the poor would live in
subsidized homes side-by-side with the middle class. 170
Under the current federal disaster relief program, the
opposite result-a reconstruction plan that perpetuates
racially- and economically-based divisions in the city171-is a
very real possibility. Affordable housing before Hurricane
Katrina was concentrated in areas that endured the greatest
flooding, such as the Lower Ninth Ward. 72 There is currently
no solid estimate for when reconstruction of these areas will
be possible. 173 Conversely, many neighborhoods at higher
74
If
elevations are currently well into reconstruction efforts.
those high-lying districts are rebuilt to mirror their preKatrina states, they will have predominantly white residents
17
and will be virtually devoid of affordable housing.
Moreover, planning affordable housing solely in areas in
which it was previously located-areas not scheduled for
reconstruction in the foreseeable future-could delay the
availability of affordable housing to New Orleans residents. 7 6
The resulting dilemma is this-many former residents of
affordable housing may be forced to permanently relocate
outside of New Orleans. 7 7
Some fear this would be an engineered result-that the
reconstruction of New Orleans will become a large urban
78
renewal project, in the worst possible sense of the analogy.
Reconstruction of the region could conceivably be used as an
attempt to remove "undesirables" from New Orleans-namely
poor and minority residents. 79 A reconstruction plan that
does not provide adequate affordable housing would
accomplish this result, as many poorer minorities would
likely be unable to return to New Orleans.
169. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
170. Tanner, supra note 101.
171. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
172. See Tanner, supra note 101.
173. See supra notes 97-98, 106-108 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 94-95, 107 and accompanying text.
175. The high-lying districts in New Orleans were more affluent than the
lower-lying districts. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 106-108.
177. See supra notes 99-101, 113-116 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 123, 125-126 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. This concern mirrors
the problems surrounding urban renewal projects themselves. See supra notes
145-147 and accompanying text.
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The importance of a reconstruction plan for New Orleans
that includes affordable housing in many neighborhoods, even
the more affluent, is obvious."' 0 In order to avoid recreating
the racially divided demographics of pre-disaster New
Orleans,' 8 ' a thoughtful, socially-conscious reconstruction
plan is required. One way to ensure this is to increase federal
involvement in reconstruction planning-providing direction
to states, lessening the influence of local politics, and
ensuring adequate housing for all city residents.
C. Using ProgressiveElements of Urban Renewal Legislation
as a Guide
One federal program related to displacement-the urban
renewal program' 8 2 -includes provisions that are explicitly
designed to protect poor and minority interests. 183 Governed
by the URA,lM the urban renewal relief program has some
progressive features, making it an appropriate point of
comparison for any relief program. First, the URA recognizes
the racial and socio-economic implications of administering
relief programs. 185 Urban renewal legislation attempts to
equalize the availability of relief, and affirmatively places the
responsibility 6 for program performance on the federal
8
government. 1
Additionally, the URA makes a concerted effort toward
federal and state officials working in tandem to administer
the urban renewal program. 7 The federal-local program
emphasizes local responsibility, while recognizing the
importance of federal direction in conceiving, planning, and
carrying out the program.18 This federal-state coordination
is not required by the Stafford Act's reconstruction funding

180. Andy Kopplin, the executive director of the Louisiana Recovery
Program, is trying to create a development program to "'deconcentrate poverty'
with mixed-income housing that combines market-rate and various levels of
subsidized housing." Maggi, supra note 117.
181. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
182. See discussion supra Part II.D.
183. See discussion supra Part II.D. 1.
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2003).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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program. 189
This is not to suggest that urban renewal projects are
perfect models upon which to mirror other relief programs.
Despite the additional safeguards incorporated in urban
renewal statutes, 19° traditionally disadvantaged populations
are
still
negatively
affected. 191
Displacement
disproportionately affects socially vulnerable populationsnamely minorities, low-income households, and renters.19 2
These persons are often "priced out" of their former
residences, as the renewed area is often geared toward
middle- and upper-income families. 193 Additionally, it is often
difficult for minority residents to relocate because of the everpresent obstacle of housing discrimination, and low-income
94
households are limited due to cost factors.1
Despite any perceived shortcomings of the overall
program, however, the progressive provisions of the
legislation underlying urban renewal
relief remain
influential. Recent amendments to the Stafford Act suggest
that Congress may be trying to incorporate provisions similar
to those in the URA. 19 ' For example, in 2001, section 5197h
was added to the Act.' 96 This section established a program
that in part designated funds to develop and promote
emergency preparedness education programs for minority
communities. 197 This recognition of unique minority needs in
disaster response validates the assertion that disaster relief
legislation must include special provisions to adequately
guarantee protection of minority interests. As urban renewal
placed responsibility on the federal government to ensure
adequate affordable housing for displacees, so too does the

189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2003). No provisions in the Stafford Act
require discussions about reconstruction between federal and state officials. Id.
190. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
191. See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
192. See Salsich, supra note 56, at 336 n.9.
193. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
194. See Salsich, supra note 56, at 336 n.9.
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2003). Whether the URA was actually
considered when drafting the Stafford Act is unclear from the Act's legislative
histories.
196. 42 U.S.C.§ 5197h (Supp. 2005).
197. Id. § 5197h(b)(2). This section also required research to determine the
status of emergency preparedness and disaster response awareness in AfricanAmerican and Hispanic households in urban, suburban and rural communities.
Id. § 5197h(b)(1).
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Stafford Act place some level of responsibility on the federal
government to educate minorities about disaster relief.
Through section 5197h, the Stafford Act added special
provisions to inform minority communities about emergency
preparedness and how to protect their households and
disaster. 198
major
a
of
advance
in
communities
Unfortunately, the same consideration is not present in the
portions of the Act dealing with relief efforts following a
major disaster.199
The Act also lacks a federal-state
consultation requirement regarding reconstruction,20 0 which
has been a positive element of the federal urban renewal
program. °1
V. PROPOSAL
In order to ensure that the interests of all residents in an
affected
area
are
adequately
represented
during
reconstruction, the federal government should accept
responsibility beyond providing the necessary funding. The
ultimate proposal of this comment is as follows: Receipt of
federal funds for the purpose of reconstruction should be
made conditional on the prior establishment of a
comprehensive reconstruction plan 20 2 by the state and/or local
198. See id.
199. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2003) (lacking specific provisions for
protection of minority interests following disaster).
200. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.

201. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
202. The term "comprehensive plan" is often used in the context of zoning
ordinances. See, e.g., DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND

USE 39 (4th ed. 2004). It is used interchangeably with other terms: "general
plan," "city plan," "development plan," and "master plan." Charles M. Haar, In
Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1154 n.3 (1955).
The plan directs long-term physical development of a community. Id. at 1155.
It "embodies information, judgments, and objectives collected and formulated by
experts to serve as both a guiding and predictive force ....[, paying] attention
to the goals selected by the community from the various alternatives
propounded...." Id.
Proponents of comprehensive plans believe they are required to ensure
consideration is given to the needs of the community as a whole. "Without [the
comprehensive plan], there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the
insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not
become nothing more than just a Gallup poll." Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463,
469 (1968).

New Orleans has made efforts in this area. The Bring New Orleans
Back Commission created a "City-Wide Coordination Plan," including a number
of elements to ensure that neighborhood and city-wide plans are consistent.

2007]

ACCOUNTABILITY IN RECONSTRUCTION

119

governments, 20 3 to be submitted to and approved by federal
officials. The submitted reconstruction plan should include
adequate affordable housing for poor and minority renters,
and such housing should ideally be dispersed throughout the
region-even if affordable housing had been concentrated in
limited, specified areas pre-disaster.
A.

ConditionalFunding

Conditional federal funding to states is a feasible
endeavor.204 The FEMA-State Agreement already attaches
certain requirements to federal relief funding 2 5 and provides
the mechanism to add additional conditions.2 6 Logistically, it
would be as simple as adding additional "boiler plate"
language to the Agreement, requiring a state to construct a
comprehensive reconstruction proposal before receiving
federal funds for reconstruction.2 7
Other federal programs currently require states to create
a proposal before receiving federal grants from FEMA. °s
Therefore, there is not only a mechanism to attach a
reconstruction plan requirement through the FEMA-State
Agreement, but also an existing familiarity with reviewing
such plans at a federal level.
BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK, supra note 84, at 16-17.

The information

accumulated would culminate in a 'draft Master plan recommendation" to the
City Planning Commission. Id. at 16.
203. In the zoning context, the power to plan a municipal region and regulate
the use of land is a valid exercise of the state police power, when done for the
general welfare. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387
(1926). The state can delegate the planning power to the municipalities
through state enabling acts. See Haar, supra note 202, at 1154. States
increasingly require local government to engage in planning. See CALLIES ET
AL., supra note 202, at 39-40.
204. See discussion supra Part II.B.
205. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion supra Part II.B.
207. This comment does not purport to estimate the amount of additional
delay the creation of a reconstruction plan will place on the receipt of federal
funds; it only discusses its utility and feasibility. It recognizes, however, that
there are existing concerns that FEMA funding is already slow under the
current system. See, e.g., Gyan, supra note 91, at 03B.
208. "The statutes for some programs require States to submit plans before
receiving grants." 44 C.F.R. § 13.11(a) (2005). For example, the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), 44 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.6, 206.430-.440, which
seeks to lessen the impact of future natural disasters, requires states to create
both a State Mitigation Plan and State HMGP Administration Plan. See id. §§
201.4-.6 (state and local mitigation plans); 206.437 (state administrative plan).
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Further, the requirements of the Tenth Amendment 2 °9
are unlikely to affect the success of the condition. The
Supreme Court has never invalidated conditional federal
spending as impermissibly impeding state autonomy under
the Tenth Amendment.2 10
B. Federal-StateConsultationRequirement
Any changes to the Stafford Act and/or corresponding
sections of the Code of Federal Regulations should
incorporate a federal-state consultation requirement. This
requirement should mandate not only discussions between
state and federal officials, but also the type of application and
review procedure contemplated at the beginning of this
section.
Federal-state consultation is not a foreign concept.
Interaction between federal and state governments is
mandated in urban renewal legislation, for example, and has
worked well in that context. 21 ' This requirement would
eliminate at least some of the political pressures of local
government-a process in which minorities and poor
residents are less likely to be involved.21 2 Therefore, it would
more adequately ensure that the housing needs of the poor
and minority residents displaced by a major disaster are
considered during reconstruction.
The Stafford Act already recognizes, in many of its
21 3
sections, the importance of consultation with state officials.
One element of the current program goes even further,
requiring public comment when changes are made to
programs administered by FEMA under the Act. 214 Further,
Executive Order 12,612, which applies to the federal disaster
relief program, requires consultation with state governments

209. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
211. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
212. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
213. One condition of receiving disaster grants under the Act is that, at the
President's discretion, safe land use and construction practices be required. 42
U.S.C. § 5165(a) (2003). In that case, "adequate consultation with appropriate
State and local government officials" is required. Id. § 5165a(a)(2). Also, in
establishing the federal disaster relief program, the President had to consult

and coordinate with states and local governments to establish criteria for
approval of assistance applications. Id. § 5 170c(c).
214. Id. § 5165c.
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before implementing an action that would limit the
policymaking discretion of the states. 215 The import placed on
federal and state input should be mirrored in provisions of
the Stafford Act that govern reconstruction funding to states.
C. Anticipating Resistance
There will likely be resistance to increased federal
involvement in state activities. It is nonetheless realistic that
the proposal be implemented in a way that would meet
constitutional requirements and avoid an impermissible
intrusion on state autonomy.2 1 6 The proposed condition will
certainly serve the "general welfare"21 7 as it will ensure equal
treatment
of city
residents
during reconstruction.
Additionally, the condition would have the requisite
relationship to the purpose of the spending program at
issue. 2181 Congress must ensure, however, that the condition
is unambiguously stated so the states are aware of the
consequences of accepting federal disaster relief funds.2 19
Given that additional conditions regarding reconstruction
are constitutionally practicable, the federal government
should use them to accept a certain level of responsibility in
reconstruction planning. This would ensure that the housing
needs of minorities and poor residents are not ignored in
reconstruction plans created by state and local governments.
Adopting some variation on the federal disaster relief
conditions proposed here would be an effective way of
protecting poor and minority housing interests in
reconstruction.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress and FEMA have created a federal disaster
215. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

216. See discussion supra Part II.B.
217. See supra text accompanying note 48.

218. See supra text accompanying note 48. The purpose of the Stafford Act,
and the corresponding FEMA statutes, is "to provide an orderly and continuing
means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments
in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage
caused by disasters." H.R. REP. No. 100-517 (1988). Giving feedback to states
regarding a required reconstruction plan would fit into this goal; it would assist
state and local governments, and it would serve to alleviate the damage caused
by the disaster.
219. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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relief program that lacks concrete requirements for federalstate interactions during the crucial period of reconstruction
following a major disaster.22 ° Consequently, local politics
would undoubtedly play a major role in the formation of a
reconstruction plan. As minority and poor populations are
least likely to be involved in the political process,2 2' their
interests could be overlooked.
This is particularly troublesome in a situation like that
in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005-when a city
is completely demolished by a major disaster. In such a
circumstance, officials have the daunting task of rebuilding a
region anew. Pre-Katrina New Orleans had a large number
of minority citizens, and it is undoubtedly a difficult task to
create a reconstruction plan that adequately represents the
housing interests of all residents.
Federal involvement
should be mandated to ensure the housing interests of
minority residents are not set aside during reconstruction
planning at the local level.
The amendment to the current relief program under the
Stafford Act and related FEMA regulations proposed by this
comment depends on the utilization of the FEMA-State
Agreement.2 2 2 Additional conditions should be included in the
Agreement, making the receipt of federal funds for
reconstruction conditional on the creation of an acceptable
reconstruction plan for the affected region.
This would
facilitate federal-state interactions, and make the federal
government accountable during reconstruction, so that
federal disaster relief truly provides for every citizen
displaced by a major disaster.

220. See supra note 5.
221. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
222. See discussion supra Part II.B.

